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Research on insight problem solving sets itself a challenging goal: How to explain the 
origin of a new idea. It compounds the difficulty of this challenge by traditionally seeking to 
explain the phenomenon in strictly mental terms. Rather, we suggest that thoughts and 
actions are bound to objects, inviting a granular description of the world within which 
thinking proceeds. As the reasoner transforms the world, the physical traces of these changes 
can be mapped in space and time. Not only can the reasoner see these changes, and act upon 
them, the researcher can develop new inscription devices that captures the trajectory of the 
creative arc along spatial and temporal coordinates. Kinenoetic is a term we employ to 
capture the idea that knowledge comes from the movement of objects and that this knowledge 
is both at the level of the problem-solver and at the level of the researcher. This form of 
knowledge can only be constructed in problem solving environments where reasoners can 
manipulate physical elements. A kinenoetic analysis tracks and maps the changes to the 
object-qua-models of proto solutions, and in the process unveils the physical genesis of new 
ideas and creativity. Our aim here is to lay out a method for using the objects commonly 
employed in interactive problem-solving research, tracing the process of thought to elucidate 
underlying cognitive mechanisms. Thus, the focus turns from the effects of objects on 
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Kinenoetic Analysis: Unveiling the Material Traces of Insight 
Problem solving is manifest whenever a living creature navigates an uncertain world. 
The problems it faces can be mundane and demonstrably rooted in the resolution of 
uncomfortable physical states– how to get enough food to eat to remove the physical feeling 
of hunger – or far more abstract yet still uncomfortable states – think of philosophers 
wrestling with problems such as the nature of derived content. Simply put, problem solving in 
all its forms is an essential part of lived experience; the resolution of ignorance, is 
foundational to understanding how people gain knowledge (Arfini, 2019).  
Problem solving in its more abstract form is also an example of the kind of effortful 
thinking considered as a form of so-called ‘higher’ cognition. The cognitivist research 
tradition favours studies of a quantitative nature (Ball & Ormerod, 2017; Bickhard, 1992; 
Kuiken et al., 1992; Smythe, 1992). The problem for such a research programme is to 
uncover invisible or unconscious thought processes. This it typically does through 
experiments which assume that problem solving proceeds through a rational and 
generalisable manner. Other methods employed are eye tracking which aims to uncover 
thought as expressed through attention or brain scans which track thought in terms of brain 
activity. The work presented in this paper aims to strengthen our understanding of problem 
solving and thought by suggesting an additional method of tracking cognition which 
complements existing research programmes. We present a kinenoetic analysis of cognition, a 
method which is observational in nature and draws from work on the extended mind (e.g., 
Wilson & Clark, 2009), cognitive archaeology (e.g., Malafouris, 2020) and science studies 
(e.g., Latour & Woolgar, 1986) to support the notion that thinking is reflected and even, more 
strongly, constituted by actions in the world.  
Kinenoetic is a term we employ to capture the idea that knowledge comes from the 
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knowledge: this form of cognition is only evidenced in environments where problem solvers 
can interact with objects and these interactions with objects leave measurable material traces. 
The gulf between epistemology and ontology is collapsed since what the reasoner knows and 
what is in the world are co-constructed (they “co-respond” as Latour [2013, p. 86] puts it). 
These material traces become an experimental artifact and an object of interest. A kinenoetic 
analysis tracks and maps the changes to the object-qua-models of proto solutions, and in the 
process unveils the physical genesis of new ideas and creativity. 
Kinenoetic analysis is predicated on two inter-related methodological practices. The 
first reverses the traditional direction of competence and performance. Kinenoetic analysis 
foregrounds action on a material object as the antecedent of knowledge or meaning, not as its 
consequent: “Competence follows performance rather than preceding it” (Latour, 2013, p. 
230). The second is a granular description of changes in the object that hamstrings the 
traditional reflex of endowing intentionality to the agent, intentionality that begs an 
explanation rather than providing one; postulating intent requires explaining the nature and 
origin of intent, deflecting theoretical attention away from the world in favour of the agent, 
and more specifically what is in her head. Objects are made to do something (or in French 
faire faire), and it is the performance of the object that provide hints and cues to new 
knowledge.  
Insight Problem Solving 
Research in problem solving commonly focuses on two sorts of problems: Analytical 
problems and insight problems. Analytical problems are those which can be solved in a step-
by-step manner (such as mental arithmetic), while insight problems require a leap that crosses 
discontinuities between an incorrect problem representation to a more fruitful one. Take for 
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solve the following riddle: how to distribute 17 animals in four enclosures such that there is 
an odd number of animals in each enclosure. The problem masquerades as a simple 
arithmetic one, and naïve participants labour fruitlessly in their attempts to identify which 
combination of 4 odd numbers can add to 17, an impossibility with whole numbers (indeed 
some participants sometimes suggest that carving up animals is the only possible solution). 
The hypothesised moment of insight comes when the participants realises that a potential 
solution involves overlapping pens which allow some animals to be enclosed in more than 
one pen.  
The challenge or the “puzzle of creative cognition” (Ohlsson, 2018, p. 12) is how to 
develop a model of the origin of a novel thought from a closed system that does not contain 
that thought. Insight research, on this view, is fundamentally concerned with the cognitive 
capacity to conjure something from nothing or indeed, if this capacity even exists. Whereas 
analytical problems lend themselves to computational modelling which relies on culturally 
predetermined model of normative problem solving (although see Lave, 1988; Nunes et al., 
1993 for suggestions that this normative approach is not always followed), the underlying 
tension in insight problem solving is that the process by which a new thought is generated is 
unclear to the researcher or indeed the participants under scrutiny. Despite some bold 
attempts, this type of problem solving generally struggles when investigated or measured 
using typical methods from cognitive psychology which are dependent on normative and 
algorithmic assumptions. Simply put, insight is idiosyncratic and hard to reliably elicit 
(Batchelder & Alexander, 2012; Chu & MacGregor, 2011).  
The disciplinary conceptual framework of the cognitive psychologist naturally orients 
her focus on content and mental processes, away from the broader physical and social context 
in which discovery happen. To crank up data fast in a cost-efficient manner, creative 
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with very complex problems. Rather, university undergraduates are presented with batteries 
of simple riddles and word associate problems, each presented for a few minutes (or seconds) 
and participants’ performance is aggregated in terms of solution rates or mean latency to 
solution. Problems vary in their numerical, logical or visuo-spatial aspects; they are made 
easier or harder to solve (by adding irrelevant and misleading premises); the phenomenology 
of discovering the answer is sometimes measured, to capture the qualia of ‘aha’ moments. 
Sometimes participants are immobilized in a scanner, and the neural correlates of insightful 
solutions are imaged in coloured areas of brain activity.  
In an attempt to develop abstract computational models of how mental representations 
are transformed to yield new ideas and solutions, laboratory research on insight often glosses 
over key features of creative problem solving as recounted by scientists, artists and engineers 
(Glăveanu et al., 2013; Vallée‐ Tourangeau & March, 2020). From these we learn that the 
development of knowledge, the genesis of new ideas, the production of a work of art, 
proceeds on the basis of gradual transformations of physical objects along a contingent arc. 
What is transformed are objects, be they sentences, experimental apparatus, canvases, lumps 
of clay. Each change in the object triggers new perceptions and new actions that enact change 
in the object in an iterative loop. Accepting this interdependence of thought and object 
requires a different methodology.  It is no longer enough to assume that a disconnected 
thought is the same as an embedded one. The traditional quantitative methods of cognitive 
psychology may not be able to fully investigate problem solving that unfolds in this way. To 
do such work justice we need to step outside disciplinary allegiances and look to work in 
more embedded research fields which adopt a more descriptive and inductive approach to 
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Experimental cognitive psychology has not been immune to the need to include things 
outside of the head in its models of how we think. In the main, this area of work is dominated 
by embodied cognition but here we are less interested in the extension of the mind into the 
body than the development of object-thought mutualities. That is, we are interested in the 
thinking that arises when objects and thoughts are bound together through actions so that 
understanding of one is dependent on the other. Until now, much of the research on this 
mind-world coupling has comes from the area of interactivity. Interactivity describes the 
coupling of the agent with her environment. It commonly proceeds by allowing an 
experimental participant access to malleable physical problem representations and assesses 
whether this leads to improved performance. It has both a computational basis, items from the 
external world are often “recruited” and an ecological one—it is a form of “sense saturated 
coordination that contributes to human action” (Steffensen, 2017, p. 86). The agent is both 
active and yet constituted by those same actions and it is thus better seen as a systemic rather 
than agent-centred approach to cognition. A systemic approach suggests that cognitive 
processes are fundamentally changed when in interaction with the environment and so 
requires an experimental procedure that reflects that.  
Experimental research in interactivity traditionally contrasts low interactivity 
environments with high interactivity ones. Participants are presented problems which invite 
and allow an interaction with the environment typically in the form of movable external 
representation such as numbered tokens (e.g., to solve arithmetic problems; Ross et al., 2020; 
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013) or letter tiles (e.g., in a word production task; Maglio et al., 1999; 
Ross & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2021). However, people can also be invited to interact with more 
complex physical objects such as string and thumb tacks (Chuderski et al., 2020) or even jars 
and water (Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2011). These artefacts can be actual objects (e.g., 
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Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2020). The only constraint is that they must be able to be moved 
and transformed. Necessarily, these are ‘first order’ problems (Vallée‐ Tourangeau & March, 
2020), that is problems which invite the participants to solve them through and with the 
environment rather than problems which take the form of riddles or other similarly abstracted 
mental tasks (and hence engages what we term ‘second order’ thinking; what Clark [2010, p. 
23] refers to as ‘off-line reasoning’).  
In a high interactivity condition, the participants are invited to move the artefacts as 
they choose. In the low interactivity condition, their movements are limited or constrained. 
The exact nature of the low interactivity condition and the movement constraints vary across 
studies: participants are sometimes given pencil and paper (Chuderski et al., 2020), or they 
are allowed to move freely without rearranging artefacts (Ross & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2021) 
or their movements are restrained, with hands laid flat on the table (Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 
2016). What is constant across these operationalizations is the static nature of the initial 
problem presentation: it cannot be physically transformed or modified.  
The research programme into interactivity thus far aimed to demonstrate the 
augmentative effect of cognitive extension. An experiment has ‘worked’ if it establishes that 
performance is better in the high interactivity condition. Indeed, the empirical data from the 
research in interactivity strongly supports that engaging with external, movable 
representations changes performance and, by implication, underlying processes whether for 
Bayesian reasoning (G. Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2015), insight problem-solving (Vallée-
Tourangeau et al., 2016) or mental arithmetic (Ross et al., 2020). This suggests that 
embedding participants in a materially rich environment will improve human performance 
which has important implications beyond the laboratory (Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2020). However, the evidence reported is inconclusive at times: interactivity 
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of individual differences or tasks (Chuderski et al., 2020; Maglio et al., 1999; Ross & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2021).  
Object-thought Mutualities. Until recently, while embracing an externalist and 
complex view of cognition, the interactivity research programme was by and large solidly 
anchored in a quantitative research tradition. Our aim here is to outline a method for using the 
objects commonly employed in interactive problem-solving research not as an experimental 
manipulation but rather as an instrumentalized procedure to trace the process of thought. 
Thus, the focus turns from the effects of objects on thoughts, to tracing object-thought 
mutualities as they are enacted and made visible. Our critical reflections are geared to explore 
more fully the promissory note that any interactive task environment offers to researchers 
willing to adopt a more qualitative approach. An interactivist perspective on insight invites a 
shift in methodology, a shift that has been resisted in past research efforts on the role of 
interactivity in cognition (with some notable exceptions, e.g., Steffensen et al., 2016). 
Laboratory research on creativity that crafts task environments where participants can interact 
with a physical object invites the careful description of the agent-world coupling. As an agent 
transforms the world, the physical traces of these changes can be mapped in space and time. 
Not only can the reasoner see these changes, and act upon them, the researcher can develop 
new inscription devices that captures the trajectory of the creative arc along spatial and 
temporal coordinates. A shift to a more qualitative capture of the genesis of new ideas is the 
logical development afforded by the four elements of an interactive problem-solving task 
environment: (i) actions, (ii) objects, (iii) space and (iv) time.  
Objects and artifacts have been the focus of qualitative research, of course (for a 
review, see Chamberlain & Lyons, 2017). Objects, their creators, users and collectors, can be 
interrogated; the role of objects as actants in configuring systems and networks within which 
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Smith (2014) outline different object-centered programmes of research in terms of their 
biography, materiality, and practice. Kinenoetic analysis focuses on their movement and 
transformation along a creative arc that can span different time scales (viz., the condensed 
time scale of the cognitive psychologist who explores problem solving in a short time 
interval, to the ethnographer of a work of art that traces its evolution and transformation over 
weeks or months). It focuses on the observable and verifiable actions on objects. The 
researcher’s knowledge in these cases comes from the movement of object-thoughts in the 
world rather than from a contemplation either of cognitive process abstracted from the world 
or self-constructed life worlds. The data here are not generated by text-based analysis but by 
observations of behaviours and actions. These observations come from a mapping of the 
physical nature of these transformations of and actions on objects in space and time.  
Kinenoetic analysis focuses on tracking changes in the world, changes in objects, rather 
than the conjectured changes in the creator’s mental representation of these objects. The form 
of kinenoetic analysis described here is made possible by the detailed scrutiny of video data 
and the instrumentalization of the problem task so that it becomes both measure and 
instrument. Qualitative work sometimes addresses the creative process through the 
understanding of the participant (Lahlou, 2011) but this is not the aim here and indeed the 
qualitative nature of the data should be dissociated from a qualitative epistemological 
position; this connection is not a logical or necessary one. There is a tendency for methods to 
be subsumed under the philosophical position and the contents of the methods less important 
than the research philosophy which underpins them (Niglas, 2010). Bryman (2007) reports 
that mixed methods researchers struggled to integrate research from both traditions because 
they view the two areas of research as distinct paradigms with distinct epistemological 
allegiances. We argue that this is not necessarily the case and the link between a 
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at the expense of the research question. The work here proceeds from a pragmatist position 
which suggests that researchers should recruit the methods which most suit the research 
question (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009; Engel et al., 2013). Kinenoetic analysis combines three 
levels of investigation of the problem with different epistemological underpinnings to shed 
light on complex processes.  
Qualitative Approaches in Creative Problem-solving Research 
A so-called pure insight sequence, the sequence that has exercised problem solving 
researchers since Köhler (1925) can be characterized in terms of the following stages: a 
reasoner labours a solution but efforts are motivated by an incorrect interpretation of the 
problem. In theory, an impasse inevitably ensues, leading to a period of despondency and 
inactivity; the aha moment is the sudden breakthrough, the new felicitous interpretation of the 
problem that re-energizes the reasoner to think more productively about the problem and 
achieve a solution. Crucially, researchers pinned their efforts on equally ‘pure’ insight 
problems (Weisberg, 1995), an a priori carving of problems into two natural kinds: those 
requiring insight for their solution, and other problems, analytic problems—e.g., mental 
arithmetic or the Tower of Hanoi—which can be solved in the absence of an insight 
sequence, since the agents are said to understand the nature of the solution and the operators 
required to transform the start state into the goal state. 
While insight problem solving is still dominated by a quantitative research programme, 
some of the more important findings recently have come from more qualitative approaches. 
These finding have cast doubt on the idea of a pure insight sequence which can be extracted 
from aggregated scores whether that is on a procedural or phenomenological level. It is 
important to note that these qualitative approaches offered the only way that the pure insight 
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they were built into the model and hence were sheltered from critical reflections. However, 
there is converging evidence that points to equifinality in the problem-solving solution and 
this needs to be considered in building predictive models: There are many different routes to 
the same solution and there is no guarantee that any two problem solvers will reach the same 
answer via the same route so taking problem solution rates as evidence of process may not be 
helpful. The qualitative research to date has taken two main forms: in task verbal protocols 
and post task self-reports. There have also been attempts to map the idiosyncratic nature of 
the thought process in insight through detailed case studies. Here we briefly review these 
before moving on to illustrate our own contribution to this growing and important literature. 
Verbal protocols  
Verbal protocols are perhaps the most common way of tracking process. They consist 
of asking participants to speak while they are performing a task, in this case solving a 
problem. There are two main problems with this, one theoretical and one practical. First, 
cognitive psychology posits the presence of unconscious processes which are beyond 
understanding (Ball & Ormerod, 2017) and so reliance on an individual’s in-the-moment 
introspection may mean that important processes and explanatory factors that occur outside 
of the problem solver’s conscious awareness go unnoticed. Therefore, it is a technique for 
understanding the information which participants are paying attention to rather than all the 
contributory factors. Second, the use of these think aloud techniques may have 
overshadowing effects: speaking while problem solving may change the process. However, 
the extent to which this affects performance on insight tasks is unclear (Fleck & Weisberg, 
2013). Despite this, think aloud protocols have many benefits for fleshing out process beyond 
analysis of latencies or binary performance outcomes. For example, Fleck and Weisberg’s 
(2013) study employed verbal protocols specifically to examine when and how often a “pure” 
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from this more granular, process-based method suggests that the nature of insight is more 
complex and diverse than existing models (e.g., Ohlsson, 1992; 2011) may assume. It is 
interesting to note that the verbal protocols cited at length in Fleck and Weisberg (2013) were 
taken from participant working on solving a problem with a physical model of the solution. 
One of these problems was the triangle of coins problem (as described more fully below). 
The changes in the physical configuration of the problem were observed by the participant, 
which cued new actions, promoting the dynamic transformation of the model of the solution. 
The verbal protocol procedure employed by Fleck and Weisberg was not coupled to a 
detailed coding of the actions and changes to the model of the solution. Thus, in the absence 
of a granular temporal juxtaposition of narrative and physical transformation, the verbal 
protocols may reflect a post hoc narrative of actions and their consequences, and as such offer 
a distorted window on the actual process that drove problem solving activity (see Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2014).  
Self-report 
The other evidence for different ways of solving the problem comes from reports from 
participants themselves. These reports are often collected after the task and relate to the 
feelings elicited on realizing the solution to the problem. Insight is considered to have a 
distinct phenomenological marker, corresponding to the impasse resolution stage. Research 
from Webb and colleagues (2016, 2018) across two studies using these post task reports now 
suggest that the binary split between analytical and insight problems, a key theoretical 
foundation stone, may be misplaced. Rather, insight is idiosyncratic and unreliable and is not 
guaranteed by a certain class of problems. However, there are problems with self-reports. As 
outlined above, the processes leading up to insight are theoretically not consciously available 








MATERIAL TRACES OF INSIGHT  13 
the participant in the experiment having the same understanding as the researcher and it not 
clear, certainly for insight, that is always the case (Bilalić et al, 2021). 
Theoretical models of the cognitive processes underlying insight problems have been 
updated after behaviour and self- report are taken into account; the moment of impasse has 
been downgraded and the realisation that problems are solved in diverse ways which cannot 
be easily modelled from the problem itself. In the instances of the measuring of 
phenomenological approaches to insight, it is still unclear that this adds to an explanation of 
process. The distinction between phenomenology and process is being collapsed and 
problems which generate higher self-report scores of insight are said to be solved more 
insightfully but as evidence emerges that propensity to experience insight may be an 
important individual difference (Webb et al., 2021), the link between phenomenology and 
process needs to be established rather than assumed.  
Kinenoetic Analysis 
We recently explored how people discover the solution to a traditional “insight” 
problem, namely the triangle of coins (AUTHORSa). The problem is presented as 10 coins 
that configure a triangular shape pointing down (see Figure 1 top panel). The goal is to 
transform the shape into a triangle that points up. Unconstrained, people can easily conjure up 
the solution. The impasse is created with the following constraint: only three coins should be 
moved to achieve the solution. The conceptual shift concerns the status of the coins as 
contenders for movement. At the start all 10 coins are plausible candidates. The interpretation 
of the problem is restructured when participants understand that not all coins are equal 
contenders; only the corner vertices should be moved. We instrumentalized this traditional 
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also labelled each coin (the corner coin labels are colour coded here, but they were not for the 
participants in our experiment).  
 Figure 1. Instrumentalizing the triangle of coins problem. 
We presented the problem on a computer tablet (see Figure 2) with which participants 
can touch, move and ‘drop’ coins on the grid as they labour to discover the solution. Each 
move transforms the physical presentation of the problem. This physical presentation is the 
object that is manipulated by the participants. We filmed the participants, and then coded the 
videos to extract each change in the physical presentation of the problem, mapping in 
granular detail the spatio-temporal changes to the proto-solutions that eventually 
corresponded with the normative configuration. Participants can see, rather than mentally 
simulate, the physical result of these transformations. In turn, as researchers, we can capture 
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The triangle of coins problem is a difficult problem: fewer than 10% solve the 
problem with their first three moves or solve it quickly. Participants work long and hard, 
exploring many different configurations; rather than a sudden flash of insight, solutions are 
enacted gradually. Take, for example, the frame by frame changes to the problem 
presentation enacted by one of our participants (Figure 3; these are the last 20 moves leading 
to the discovery of the solution; this participant solved the problem with 71 moves). The first 
two rows in Figure 3 illustrates a common but unproductive strategy, namely moving coins 
up (e.g., see configurations created after move 54, move 60) resulting in configurations that 
force participants to move more than three coins to achieve the solution. The last two rows 
(moves 62 onwards) illustrate a more productive strategy, namely moving coins down to, 
widen the base of the triangle. Note, however, that the participant cannot be said to have 
mentally simulated the solution but rather, these more productive configurations encouraged 
and prompted different movements, that eventuated in the solution.  
 
Figure 2. The triangle of coins problem programmed on a tablet; participants are 
filmed working on the problem. Each move and resulting transformation of the problem 
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Figure 4. The migration ratio (primary y axis) and latency per move (secondary y axis) for 
the last 20 moves of a participant working on the triangle of coins; these data correspond to 
the last 20 moves illustrated in Figure 3 above. The green dotted line is the target migration 
ratio that corresponds to the solution of the problem. 
To capture the spatio-temporality of the construction of the solution, we developed an 
index termed the migration ratio which gauges the degree to which the configuration of coins 
approximates the normative configuration. The target migration ratio1 that corresponds to the 
correct configuration is .67, and Figure 4 plots how this migration ratio evolved for the 
moves made by the same participant whose last 20 moves were illustrated in Figure 3. Based 
on the video data, we could measure the latency per action that changed the configuration, 
and this is plotted on the secondary axis of Figure 4. This figure enables us to see two key 
aspects of creative problem solving. The first is that a productive configuration evolves 
slowly over trials, with much turbulence as the right configuration takes shape before the 
                                                 
1 The migration ratio is the ratio of coins on row 7 over all coins above on the grid: in the start state the ratio of 
coins in row 7 over all coins above is 2/7 or .29 (see Start panel in Figure 1). The goal state involves widening 
the base of the new triangle on row 7, thus migrating down the two corner vertices (coins Q and W) on that row, 
resulting in a migration ratio of 4/6 or .67 (see Goal panel in Figure 1). Calculating the migration ratio after each 
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correct one is constructed (as illustrated by the primary data series plotted with the black 
line); the second is the variability in latency per move: some moves are enacted quickly, other 
much more slowly (plotted as the secondary data series with the dotted line). Latencies drop 
sharply once the correct configuration is produced, and at this point, the agent’s knowledge of 
the solution and its physical realization are correctly aligned. And while the last few moves 
are quite quick, the video evidence suggests that the participant reified a solution, but actions 
were not predicated on a clear hypothesis: That’s because upon observing what he had done, 
the participant physically expressed surprise: rather than experiencing insight, the participant 
seemed to have experienced ‘outsight’: the solution appears to have caught him off guard as 
it were (the video can be accessed here https://youtu.be/ZZSC549UyTg; note the sudden 
exclamation of success at 0:00:07 after creating the solution). 
Uncovering Novel Mechanisms: Serendipity Found and Lost 
We have conducted similar detailed research on performance on word games, both 
Scrabble TM style tasks (AUTHORSb) and anagrams (AUTHORSc). The use of movable, 
lettered tiles allowed us to take a granular approach to the process of problem solution and 
map strategies using the letters on the tiles as a natural path marker. Importantly, this allows 
us to track what happens when people do not get the correct solution which can occur for 
many as yet unexplored reasons. Mapping the process of problem solution as it unfolds over 
the course of problem-solving trials, we can pinpoint the moments of transformation from a 
state of ignorance to one of knowledge through action but also when that transformation was 
thwarted. Word tasks are particularly suited to this sort of analysis because the changes of the 
letter arrays can be clearly mapped and proximity to a solution can be more easily measured. 
By viewing experiments not as measures in support or not of intuitive hypotheses but 
as tools to observe the formation of soft assembled cognitive systems under controlled 
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the role of accidents: When participants are provided with cognitive artefacts to scaffold their 
thinking either as part of intentional focus as in research in interactivity or as an unconsidered 
artefact of the environmental set up, the idea of chance is often mentioned. Fioratou and 
Cowley (2009), for example describe a version of the cheap necklace problem and suggest 
that 6 of the 21 solvers (almost a third) solved the problem through the exploitation of an 
accident. This same observation occurs in Chuderski et al. (2020, p.18) who suggest that “in 
the [interactive] matchstick algebra problem, it is arguably easier to arrive at the solution by 
accident or trial and error, for instance by realizing as a result of a random movement of a 
stick that it could act as a negative sign.” In one of the few qualitative approaches to insight 
problem solving, Steffensen et al.’s (2016) finely grained analysis of problem solving (using 
the 17 animals problem described earlier) suggests that the solution hangs on an accidental 
moment.  
The course of this analysis has allowed us to elucidate the moments when a problem 
solver is close to the answer through the arrangement of tiles during which we uncovered 
moments of accidents which were responsible for the genesis of new ideas. Take for example, 
a participant in the word production task who was working with the letter set COTFAED. 
After making the word DEAF the three letters COT were left in full view. Much as the 
participant above who recognised the solution to the triangle of coins after constructing it, 
this unplanned moment of success was accompanied by clear phenomenological markers akin 
to the affective markers of insight (the video can be accessed here: 
https://youtu.be/3sV1vdM-93k).  
The same accidental and unplanned solving was true of the anagram tasks as 
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Table 1 
A Participant Solving the Anagram WORPE; Each Letter Tile Move Results in a Change in 
the Array of Letters (Shown on the Right Column). 
Time (s:ms from 
start of problem) 
Description Resulting Array 
   
15.241 Starts to move the P 
 
   
15.741 P dragged to below the main array  
 
   
16.375 R moved out of way 
 
   
17.310 O moved down next to P 
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18.411-19.178 Array is considered, head moved 
back, fingers off tiles 
 
19.178 The letter W is selected for the next 
move 
 
19.779 W is moved next to P and O. the 
move knocks the R tile and pulls it 
with the W tile in line with the P 
and the O but tilted on its side 
 
   
20.646 P71 tidies the array so that R is 
straight 
 
   
21.780 P71 moves the E down so the tiles 
are in a straight line. 
 
21.780 -23.180  P71 considers the array  
23.180 P71 traces her fingers over the R 
and the E 
 
24.450 P71 forms the word POWER 
 
25.404 P71 announces the correct answer  
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allows us to track the moments of missed opportunities. For example, in the anagram task 
participants often come close to solving the anagram but do not “see” the answer. These 
important findings are only possible with the sort of observational analysis we suggest here 
coupled with a clear instrumentalization of the experimental task. The implications of these 
missed connections are important for understanding how environmental and human agency 
interact (Ross & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2020).  
Missing the Tree in the Forest 
The granular analysis of one participant’s effort to discover the solution to the triangle 
of coins reported earlier revealed important features of creative problem solving. 
Experimental research on creative cognition, however, usually shuns this type of idiographic 
approach, and relies in turn on group means and correlational evidence. For example, the 
physical transformations of the problem presentation illustrated in Figure 3 and the spatio-
temporal trajectory to the solution in Figure 4, is a case study selected from a sample of 33 
participants who attempted to solve the problem (70% did). We also measured their visual 
imagery abilities with the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT; Irving et al., 2011). 
This is a visual guided synthesis task where participants are asked to form a mental image of 
a shape described in terms of a series of simple instructions (such as “imagine a capital letter 
D, rotate it 900 to the left, put a capital J underneath, what do you get?”; an umbrella). The 
task is composed of eight items, and participants score a point each for their ability to name 
the object described and to draw it (for a total maximum score of 16). Scores on the ICRT 
differ significantly between those who solved the triangle of coins problem and those who did 
not (Figure 5a). This suggests that visual imagery skills are implicated in creative problem 
solving involving a visuo-spatial problem. So far so good. We can also look at the correlation 
between scores on the ICRT and moves to solution among the 70% participants who solved 
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sample as it were, is insufficient to detect a robust correlation: As it stands, there appears to 
be a weak negative correlation between ICRT scores and number of moves required to solve 
the problem. This also makes sense. But what do these data and these analyses tell us 
specifically about the process involved in discovery? Very little actually.  
Figure 5. Mean ICRT score for solvers and nonsolvers (panel a; error bars are standard error 
of the mean); correlation between ICRT score and moves to solution among solvers (panel b); 
drawn from data reported in (AUTHORSa). 
The black data point in Figure 5b is the participant whose efforts to construct the 
correct triangular configuration were illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. The participant’s score on 
the ICRT is lower than the average score for the solvers. Aggregate measures of performance 
and correlational analyses do not unveil the microprocesses involved in creativity. These 
analyses must be complemented with a granular description of the transformation of the 
physical presentation of the problem over time. In the absence of these case studies, the 
genesis of a new idea will remain hidden behind aggregate measures of performance. 
Methodological Recommendations 
It was only through more finely grained analysis whether of phenomenology or 
process that the model of insight was challenged and extended to reflect participant 
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essential to test the assumptions of underlying models. Such an analysis is designed to be 
complementary to the existing quantitative research field.  
The research that we have been doing follows a simple three stage process. 
Experimental situations are designed which allow for thought as action to be traced. 
Quantitative analyses are conducted but so also are two further forms of analysis: 
Extrospection and cognitive cases. This mixed method approach allows us to triangulate 
levels of evidence to focus on process rather than outcomes.  
Extrospection 
Alongside quantitative analyses of behaviour, we suggest the use of finely grained 
observational data to support and explain the quantitative outcomes. This allows a large-scale 
analysis of behaviour. This draws from the interaction analysis, the systematic analysis of 
behaviour through observation (Bakeman & Gottman, 2009; Bakeman & Quera, 2011). The 
coding schemes can be generated in two ways: through an iterative process which allows 
themes to be generated through repeated watching of the data or by pre-specified coding to 
support prior hypotheses. Often the two ways can inform each other with a first round of 
coding using preformed codes also yield observations which can be categorised as 
exploratory. This use of codes to generate quantitative data from observations is central to the 
approach – it is systematic and quantitative rather than qualitative (Bakeman & Gottman, 
2009).  
Extrospection can support an understanding of process outside of the subjective feeling 
of the participant. Inevitably, subjectivity remains in the researcher not only in the coding but 
the choice of behaviours to code. Such a technique was used by Christensen and Friis-
Olivarius (2020) who asked participants to brainstorm on sticky Post-itTM notes and used 
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(2018) proposed a granular and generic method to capture the micro-developmental trajectory 
of creative cognition. They describe a coding scheme to capture the novelty and 
appropriateness of ideas as they are formulated over time in creative problem solving. In this 
manner, they can trace the non-linear and gradual trajectory of creativity on the basis of what 
they call ‘state space grids’. These problem-solving efforts can take place through 
interactions with an interlocutor, and these inscription devices (viz. state space grids) can be 
augmented by intersecting data that capture the conversational prompts from a teacher or 
facilitator.  
Cognitive Cases 
Steffensen (2016) has suggested that cognitive psychology could benefit from the 
application of what he terms the ‘probatonic principle’. That is, a principle which focuses on 
the “single sheep that has our full attention and which is not reducible to being part of the 
herd” (p. 30). The argument for such a shift in focus is that the unique cognitive system 
which coalesces around each problem-solving agent displays a form of variability which a 
traditional analysis that focuses only on a binary correct or incorrect answer will inevitably 
fail to identify. Steffensen suggests we can investigate this through Cognitive Event Analysis 
– a finely grained analysis which looks for pivotal moments in a problem-solving trajectory, 
phase transitions necessary for the solution to be articulated. The method relies on case 
studies and identifies small moments which may be missed in traditional experimental 
analyses. Steffensen argue that such a method is useful for generating hypotheses based in 
behaviour rather than inferences from computational models.  
The additional analysis we present in our research is the selection of a few critical 
cases.  Unlike the coded interaction analysis outlined above, the case study is intended to 
demonstrate existence not incidence (Smith et al., 1995) although it could inspire a new set of 
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themselves to this. This phase of data analysis is inductive in nature and reduces the sample 
size to generate key critical themes that can be evidenced by behaviours. There is a necessary 
subjectivity on the part of the researcher at this stage, however, the role of such an analysis is 
not interpretative but rather focuses on a detailed description. The cognitive cases form part 
of a preplanned mixed analysis plan, their purpose to elucidate conclusions drawn from the 
experimental manipulations and the statistical analysis of data sets. While it can be 
understood on its own, it is not designed to be read in such a way and the conclusions drawn 
and the levels of analysis required are driven by a requirement to understand and enrich the 
quantitative data. Its primary function is exploratory and descriptive (Yin, 2014) because the 
causal mechanisms implicit in the experimental form provide the hypothesised explanatory 
mechanisms 
One way a detailed granular analysis of particular participants can add to our 
understanding of a phenomenon is to assess whether the explanatory mechanisms we have 
assumed in our experimental manipulations are actually those which we hypothesised 
beforehand rather than assuming them from the outcome. Thus, this deeper level of analysis 
straddles the observational and the experimental. It also does not derive its validity from 
positing causal explanations but rather by suggesting the mechanisms through which the 
causal explanations already established by the experimental results are realised. It may be that 
the hypothesised explanatory factors map easily identifiable in the case study material or it 
may be that other factors emerge. Either way, it acts as a convenient and in-depth 
manipulation check.  
The granularity afforded by this deeper level of analysis allows us to be more exact 
about the mechanisms behind any effect detected in the larger population. For example, in 
(AUTHORSa) participants were invited to solve the triangle of coins problem in a low 
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one guess at the solution. While high interactivity participants solved the problem more often, 
they did so with longer solution latencies. A survey of the video material showed that in the 
high interactivity condition participants would solve the problem but because the interface 
afforded them an easy opportunity to check their answer, they would do so, that is reset the 
board and construct the solution a second time, and as result their performance latency was 
longer. So, while the condition was the cause of the difference in latency, the mechanisms 
through which it caused that difference were only revealed by case study analysis. The 
material traces of the physically realised actions involved in problem solving allowed the 
thought process to be traced.  
This level of analysis is useful to unpick the effect of the experimental manipulation 
which in turn allows us to test some of the models which are being proposed. We cast 
problem solving as a process of physical transformation and so it becomes important to map 
these transformations with a high degree of granularity. The benefit of placing participants in 
first order problem solving environments is not just that we can assess the potential benefits 
of this type of environment but also because we can use the material traces of problem 
solving to guide our understanding of how problem-solving progresses. This return to data 
and to behaviour in action reflects a pragmatist perspective rooted in observable action.  
Like Steffensen’s Cognitive Event Analysis, this level of analysis does not require 
naturalistic material. Indeed, in these cases the analysis is bound to a single problem-solving 
moment generated by an experimental situation. Thus, while the analysis deals with a small 
number of cases, the function of the analysis we are describing is more reductive than typical 
case studies: it is temporally and artificially bounded around the cognitive tasks. In many 
ways this level of analysis functions to replace the discussion section of a typical quantitative 
only research paper which is replete with – ‘it is plausible that’, or ‘informal observations 
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Furthermore, such qualitative work gives empirical support to principled hypothesis 
formation (Steffensen et al., 2016) and stretch out the boundaries of a theoretically driven 
research programme.  
The Benefits of a Qualitative Approach to Insight Problem Solving 
What defines qualitative research is often a negation: Quantitative research is numbers 
and qualitative research is what is left, often text based (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). The analysis 
we propose here takes a higher granular and qualitative approach looking at a whole data set 
and then homing in on one or more critical cases until a fuller understanding emerges from 
this plurality of perspectives. It looks more broadly, although in detail, at bounded cognitive 
events where the population of principal inference is the experimental population. It is not 
intended to replace quantitative and aggregated results but rather enhance the understanding 
of the mechanisms through which the effects of the experimental manipulation are realised. 
Bennett and Elman (2006) contrast these two aims thus: quantitative research takes an effect 
of causes approach by manipulating the cause and measuring the effects whereas qualitative 
research takes a causes of effects approach. Martin and Bateman (1993, p. 3) stress the 
importance of a study of behaviour through the use of an analogy: “perfect knowledge of how 
many times each letter of the alphabet recurs on this page would give no indication of the 
text’s meaning”. We argue that kinenoetic analysis as described here can strengthen both 
understanding of cognition but also how thought can be traced. 
There is no principled way of knowing a priori what the important moments of 
variability might be rather “to identify stable patterns, one has to investigate (the trajectory 
of) the cognitive probatonics of individual agent-environment systems” (Steffensen, 2016, p. 
31). Each time a participant enters an experimental situation, a system forms which is 
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researcher treats the system as a closed one. Quantitative research prespecifies the questions 
it will ask before observing the data. The prespecification is necessary because human 
behaviour is not directly expressed in numbers, therefore quantitative research has to decide 
what aspects of performance to convert for analysis through statistical tests. This allows it to 
test these prespecified hypotheses but variables which are not already identified will 
necessarily be excluded. Kineneotic analysis allow the testing of typically measured 
quantitative outcomes alongside a inductive approach to group and individual observational 
data. A research programme which profiles binary outcomes and perhaps some 
psychometrics can tell us how successful certain people can be in problem solving but it can 
only speculate on the reasons for why. The speculative nature of the conjectures is attenuated 
considerably when the analysis proceeds through the detailed recording of actions and the 
resulting changes in the object qua model of the solution. Kinenoetic analysis allows 
behaviour to be clearly measured through actions on objects. The overall findings can then 
add to an understanding of phenomenon under investigation.  
Conclusion 
Latour and Woolgar (1986) in Laboratory life demystify thinking, or specifically so-
called scientific thinking in a chapter titled ‘the microprocessing of facts’. Scientific 
inferences are not special or different from non-scientific inferences: the same heterogenous 
microprocesses underpin any form of inference, scientific or pedestrian. Our research on 
insight problem solving suggests that ‘insight’ does not proceed on the basis of special 
unconscious mental processes. The trajectories mapped by migration ratios and latency per 
move in the insight problem solving experiment described above are the physical traces of 
heterogenous and heteroscalar microprocesses that shape the construction of the solution. A 
methodology that only looks at solution rates and correlational evidence is at risk missing the 
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qualitative analysis of behaviour will yield new data that inform models of restructuring (cf. 
Fleck & Weisberg, 2013) and discovery. Restructuring is a key component of the “pure” 
insight sequence but happens unconsciously and in sequestered environments is both 
invisible. The analysis described here has the potential to open up these moments. This 
requires a substantial shift in the laboratory exploration of creative cognition, involving a 
mixed methodology: aggregate performance measures coupled with detailed case studies. To 
capture creativity, one must film it and code it: The granularity of analysis can reveal the 
microprocesses that undergird the emergence of creativity in a participant. 
There is a move to use eye tracking measures to assess moments of insight and track 
unconscious cognitive processes (e.g., Bilalić et al., 2021). We suggest that similar 
behaviours become manifest when participants are placed in environments where they can 
move things. As Christensen and Friis-Olivarius (2020) argue, the use of movable objects 
allows us to track thoughts through action without the need for expensive technology. 
Furthermore, a kinenoetic analysis unveils previously hidden explanatory factors by 
removing the need for a participant to be aware of those factors. This detailed attention to 
environment chance and complexity and moving the focus away from the psychometric 
properties of the person, has important implications for the design of environments to 
maximise problem solving success. This type of deeper and more finely grained analysis 
becomes particularly important when we have little control over aspects of the experimental 
set up. This is particularly salient each time we embed participants in a complex, materially 
rich world. Furthermore, a case study analysis can allow us to avoid attributing behaviours to 
an average participant who does not exist (as in Cushen & Wiley, 2012).  
If problem solving is seen as a change in the epistemic state of the participant, as 
moving from a state of ignorance to a state of understanding then it becomes clear that we 
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final state. Current problem-solving research rests on the assumption that the original 
epistemic state is the same for all people (beyond a binary one determined by whether they 
have encountered the problem before or not), that the process of state change is the same and 
can be determined by the answer and also that the final state is binary: You have either solved 
the problem or not and a correct solution indicates a correct problem representation. Given 
the clear circularity here—a correct problem representation is the only way of getting a 
correct answer and the problem representation can only be measured by a tool calibrated by 
eliciting a correct representation—a return to observation, what people do, is required to 
ground the research and avoid regress. Relying on the aggregate measures will obscure a 
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